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J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd & J.A. Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v United Kingdom, decision of 
the Grand Chamber of the European Court 30 August 2007. 
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Introduction 
 
 
One of the authors of this short article wrote sometime ago that ‘given the reforms 
made by the Land Registration Act 2002 in respect of adverse possession, it is 
unlikely that the deprivation of ownership in circumstances where the owner of the 
land it given the opportunity to object to the adverse possession will be seen as 
violating the provision of Article1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.’1
 
  This is because the new law, although allowing the squatter to apply to be 
registered as owner of the dispossessed land after 10 years of continued possession, 
requires the registered owner to be given an opportunity to claim his land back.  The 
registered proprietor has two years in which to regularize his possession of the land by 
evicting the squatter.  Where the registered owner fails to exercise his right to evict 
the squatter, the squatters subsequent claim to the land is not disproportionate and 
therefore not a violation of Article 1, Protocol 1.  Prior to the Land Registration Act 
2002, a registered owner’s title could simply be extinguished after 12 years of 
sustained possession by the squatter.  There was no mechanism to alert the registered 
owner of the fact that his title to land may be automatically extinguished after the 12 
year period. 
In the post-human rights era it was inevitable that the question would arise as to 
whether such automatic and arbitrary termination of the registered owner’s title was 
contrary to the Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention. The matter fell to be 
decided in J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom2 where the European Court of 
Human Rights held that the automatic termination of a registered owners title after 12 
years possession was indeed a violation of Article 1, Protocol 1.  The decision of the 
Court did question some of the established principles of English land law, 
particularly, the relevance of possession in the common law tradition and principle of 
relativity of title.  More recently, the decision of the European Court has been 
overturned by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights where the 
Grand Chamber has held that a squatters’ right to another persons land are not 
disproportionate.3
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welcomes it on the grounds that it gives recognition to some of the fundamental and 
long established principles of the English land law. 
 
 
The Facts 
 
The applicants were two United Kingdom Companies, J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and J.A. 
Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd.  These applicants were the registered owners of agricultural 
land, title to which they had lost in the English courts by a successful claim to adverse 
possession by the personal representative of the late Michael Graham along with 
Caroline Graham (the Grahams hereafter) who had claimed rights to 25 hectares of 
agricultural land belonging to JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd (Pye hereafter). The action was 
commenced by J.A Pye (Oxford) Ltd against the United Kingdom Government on the 
basis that it should be compensated by the Government on the grounds that it was the 
Government’s failure to ensure that legislation was in conformity with the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  Particularly, that the combined effect of the Land 
Registration Act and the Limitation Act 1980 was to deprive them of their rights 
under the Convention.  
 
In the English courts the Grahams based their argument on s.15 of the Limitation Act 
1980, which provides that no action shall be brought by a landowner to recover his 
land after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued 
to him.  Schedule 1, paragraph 1 provides that the right of action to recover land is 
deemed to have accrued to the landowner when the land owner has been either 
dispossessed of his land or has discontinued use of his land.  Dispossession usually 
refers to an ouster by the squatter, for example, where the squatter has fenced in land 
belonging to the paper owner and has since then not allowed the paper owner to enter 
on the land.  The Grahams argued that since 1984 they had taken possession of the 
land belonging to Pye and as a result they had established a successful claim of 
adverse possession.    Pye counter argued that the land had at all time belonged to 
them and that they had an intention to build on the land.  More importantly, however, 
they argued that the Grahams had at no time dispossessed them of the land.  This is 
because firstly, in 1983 the Grahams had entered into an agreement with Pye to use 
the land until 31st
 
 December 1983 for the payment of a sum of £2000.  Secondly, 
when that agreement expired the Grahams continued to use the land, there use of it 
was not inconsistent with the paper title of Pye because they were willing to pay for 
the use of land and as such were not acting as owners of it.  After 1986 Pye did very 
little in so far as the disputed land.  Pye brought proceedings in the English courts in 
1998 to recover the land.  In order to understand the decision of the Grand Chamber, 
it is important to revisit the developments that took place in the English Courts and 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
The Decisions of the English Courts 
 
At first instance the judge held that the Grahams had established a successful 
possessory title to Pye’s land and that time began to run against Pye since 1984 after 
the expiration of the licence agreement.4  The Court of Appeal reversed this finding 
and held that no successful adverse possession claim could be found simply because 
the Grahams had not dispossessed Pye from the land.5
 
  One of the main arguments in 
the case was that, even though Pye had done very little in the period between 1986 
and 1998, they were still within the limitation period to claim the land back.  In so far 
as the period between 1984 and 1986, the Court of Appeal held that there could be no 
finding of dispossession simply because the Grahams were using the land in the hope 
that a new licence agreement might be forthcoming.  This subjective intention was 
held to be crucial by the Court of Appeal because it was indicative of a form of 
implied licence by Pye that the Grahams could use the land.  The decision of the 
Court of Appeal begged the question whether a successful claim to adverse possession 
rested on the subjective intentions of both the squatter and the paper owner or whether 
on the objective intention to possess land for the requisite period of time required by 
the Limitation Act 1980? Furthermore, were subjective factors such as the willingness 
of the squatter to pay for the use of land and his subjective belief that he was not the 
owner relevant? These matters fell to be decided by the House of Lords. 
The leading judgment in the House of Lords was delivered by Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, who explained that the matter was simply one of whether the adverse 
possessor had dispossessed the paper owner by going into ordinary possession of the 
land without his consent.6  In so far as the requisite acts needed for possession, his 
Lordship explained that this required two elements.  Firstly, a sufficient degree of 
physical custody and control, this requires factual possession. Secondly, an intention 
to exercise such custody and control for his own benefit.  In so far as a need to have 
an intention to own, his Lordship referred to the words of Slade LJ in Buckingham 
County Council v. Moran7 who said that what was required was ‘not an intention to 
own or even an intention to acquire ownership but an intention to possess.’8
 
 On the 
basis of these principles, Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained that the Grahams had 
established a satisfactory possessory title to the land belonging to Pye.  Furthermore, 
their willingness to pay for the occupation of the land did not matter providing that 
they had the necessary possession at all times.  Their willingness to pay did not alter 
the fact that they had the necessary factual possession for the period of time 
prescribed by the Limitation Act 1980. 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained that whilst the statutory provisions founded in the 
Limitation Act 1980 were relatively straightforward, much of the confusion in this 
area of the law had been caused by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Leigh v. 
Jack.9 In this case Bramwell LJ held that for a successful claim of adverse possession 
‘…acts must be done which are inconsistent with the enjoyment of the soil for the 
purpose for which [the true owner] intended to use it.’10
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owner.  It mattered not how much intention and how much control the squatter had 
exerted to the disputed land.  Lord Browne-Wilkinson, however, explained that the 
line of reasoning in Leigh v. Jack had been rejected by the Court of Appeal in 
Buckingham County Council v. Moran.11 After approving of the principles set out by 
Slade LJ in Buckingham County Council v. Moran his Lordship went on to explain 
the concepts of the possession, dispossession and adverse possession.  In so far as the 
concept of possession, his Lordship explained that it was to be given its traditional 
meaning, which simply meant ‘that degree of occupation or physical control, coupled 
with the requisite intention commonly known as animus possidendi, that would entitle 
a person to maintain an action for trespass in relation to the relevant land’.12  Moving 
on to the meaning of dispossession, his Lordship gave a simplistic meaning to the 
word, explaining that it simply meant the taking of possession from another without 
the other’s consent.13
 
  
The decision of the House of Lords in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham did not only 
reaffirm the importance of possession in the common law tradition as had been 
understood historically, but it also explained that it was long sustained possession that 
is the root of a successful claim to adverse possession.  It does not matter that the 
adverse possessor does not have an actual subjective belief that he is acting as the 
owner.14  Neither does it matter that the possessor is willing to pay for the occupation 
of the land, providing that there is possession which is inconsistent with the paper 
owner’s title.15  Much of the confusion in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham arose from 
the decision of Bramwell LJ in  Leigh v. Jack16 where his Lordship explained that 
possession of the paper owner could not be disturbed by a squatter if the paper owner 
could show a future intention to use the land.  This so-called ‘implied licence theory’ 
meant that the squatter’s possession, not matter how strong and continuous, could not 
disturb the paper owner’s title.  However, this rule had been rejected by the Court of 
Appeal in Buckinghamshire County Council v. Moran 17
 
 
 
Adverse Possession, Human Rights and Article 1 of the European Convention. 
 
 
In the post-Human Rights Act era the question has arisen whether the deprivation of 
ownership of land through the principles of adverse possession is in violation of the 
European Convention on Human rights.  Put quite simply, is the cumulative effect of 
the Limitation Act 1980 in respect of claims for the recovery of land and the 
consequential denial of the right to claim land after 12 years a deprivation of a 
person’s property contrary to Article 1, Protocol 1 of the Convention.  Section 3(1) of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 imposes a duty on a domestic court to read and give 
effect to primary and subordinate legislation in a manner which is compatible with the 
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Convention.  Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
provides: 
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided by law and by the general principles of international law.’ 
The loss of ownership through adverse possession falls quite neatly into the second 
rule of Article 1, Protocol 1.  In the words of one leading commentator, ‘that an owner 
can be effectively deprived of his or her land without the payment of compensation 
and without due legal process raises the question as to the compatibility of s.15 of the 
Limitation Act 1980 with Article 1, Protocol 1.18
 
  If it is incompatible the impact of 
possession as a means of extinguishing a former title in land and creating a new one 
as discussed in this article is reduced to a meaningless concept. 
The question of whether s.15 of the Limitation Act 1980 and the consequential denial 
of ownership through adverse possession  was considered by the High Court and   
Court of Appeal in J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham.19  In the High Court Neuberger 
J, although coming to the conclusion that the Grahams has established a successful 
claim to adverse possession of land, was nevertheless sympathetic to the human rights 
arguments presented on behalf of Pye.  In the course of his judgment, Neuberger J 
commented that ‘the result is disproportionate, because, particularly in a climate of 
increasing awareness of human rights, including the right to enjoy one’s own 
property, it does seem draconian to the owner, and a windfall for the squatter, that the 
owner should lose 57 acres of land to the squatter with no compensation 
whatsoever.’20 The Court of Appeal, however, took a rather different approach to the 
compatibility of the Limitation Act 1980 with the protection of property guaranteed in 
the Convention.  Mummery LJ was of the opinion that the Limitation Act 1980, in 
particular s.15, which provides that no right of action to recover land shall be bought 
after 12 years after the right of action accrued to the legal owner, was not 
incompatible with the protection afforded in Article 1, Protocol 1 of the Convention.  
His Lordship explained that the effect of s.15 was not to deprive the legal owner of 
land his possessions or peaceful enjoyment of them, rather the effect of the Act was to 
deny access to the courts for a remedy recovering the land.  In his Lordships words, 
‘…the relevant provisions of the 1980 Act…do not deprive a person of his 
possessions or interfere with his peaceful enjoyment of them.  They deprive him of 
his right to access the courts for the purpose of recovering property if he has delayed 
the institution of legal proceedings for 12 years or more…’21
 
 
It is not altogether clear whether the distinction between a deprivation of property and 
a deprivation of a right to bring an action for the recovery of property is a satisfactory 
one in the context of property rights.  One of the crucial incidents of a person’s 
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ownership of a thing is the right to be put in possession of a thing and remain in 
possession if he so chooses.22  An equally important incident of ownership is the right 
to security, which involves an expectation on behalf of the owner that he will remain 
owner indefinitely if he so chooses.   This expectation amounts to immunity from 
expropriation except where just compensation is given to the legal owner.  In this 
respect, the right to commence an action for the recovery of property is a central 
ingredient of a person’s ownership.  The deprivation of a persons right to commence 
an action to recover his property is a deprivation of one of the very basic ingredients 
of his ownership.  The matter is explained by one commentator who writes,’is the 
ability to commence court proceedings to recover property from a trespasser a 
fundamental characteristic of property ownership? If it is, the loss of the right to 
commence court action impinges upon the very nature of property ownership and 
cannot be artificially dissected from it and treated as separate from it.’23
 
 
 
Whilst the matter in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham was referred to the European 
Court of Human Rights the English Courts had the opportunity to examine whether 
the law of adverse possession contrary to the Article 1, Protocol 1.  In Beaulane 
Properties Ltd v Palmer24
 
 Deputy Judge Strauss QC held that the effect of s17 of the 
Limitation Act 1980 was to deprive the registered owner of land of all of his right to 
it.  As a result of this, he was clearly of the view that such a deprivation was in 
violation of the rights under the Convention.  The judge did, however, go on to say 
that the new law of adverse possession founded in the Land Registration Act 2002 did 
not produce a disproportionate result and therefore was not contrary to the principles 
of the Convention. 
 
The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
 
 
The opportunity to examine whether the law of adverse possession was incompatible 
with the provisions of the European Convention fell to be decided by the European 
Court in J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd United Kingdom.25
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 The action was commenced by J.A 
Pye (Oxford) Ltd against the United Kingdom Government on the basis that it should 
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Limitation Act 1980 was to deprive the applicants of their right to peaceful enjoyment 
of their property and therefore contrary to Article 1, Protocol 1 of the Convention.  
The Court explained that the under Article 1, deprivation of peaceful enjoyment could 
only be justified on the grounds of public interest and the question was whether the 
law of adverse could be justified in such a way.  The Court explained that the national 
authorities were better placed to decide what was in the public interest.  The Court 
noted that the law of adverse possession had been retained by the Land Registration 
Act 2002 and this was proof that United Kingdom Parliament deemed the law of 
adverse possession to be in the public interest.26
 
 
 
The Court then addressed the question as to whether the law of adverse possession 
produced a disproportionate result.  The Court explained that this matter could only be 
answered by weighing the interests of the registered owner against the general public 
interest. The United Kingdom Government strongly counter argued that the law of 
adverse possession pursued a legitimate objective and was proportional to it.  In 
particular the Government pointed out that the law of adverse possession had been 
established for a long time and that the registered owners were fully aware that they 
ran the risk that their title would be extinguished.  Furthermore, the Government 
argued that the law of adverse possession did not violate Article 1, Protocol 1 because 
the matter was simply one of a limitation period rather than a taking of property.  
These arguments were rejected by the court, which concluded that the net effect of the 
law was to produce a very harsh result on the registered owner of the land that lost 
title by adverse possession.  This, therefore, meant that the law produced a 
disproportionate result and violated the principles under the Convention.  
 
 
The Decision of the Grand Chamber 
 
 
After the Chamber judgement, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber, under 
Article 432 of the Convention and Rule 73 of the Rules of the Court at the request of 
the United Kingdom Government.  The Grand Chamber delivered its judgement on 
August 30th.27
 
     
The Grand Chamber overturned the Chamber’s decision by 10 votes to 7 and 
confirmed that the balance of interests required under Article 1 of the Protocol was 
not upset and that the Grahams had not violated the Companies’ right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of their possessions.  
 
The basis of the argument from Pye now centred on three main issues. First that there 
was no justification for them to lose their right of ownership of registered land, 
second that there no justification that could justify depriving them of their land 
without compensation and thirdly that there was no justification in depriving the them 
of their land without procedural protection that would allow them the opportunity to 
respond to any such claims. In addition, in support of their case, Pye argued that in 
many other European States the limitation period was often considerably longer than 
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the 12 years applicable in their case and many other jurisdictions required additional 
criteria to be satisfied, for example, a notion of good faith.  
 
In response, the United Kingdom Government also put forward three distinct 
arguments for the Chamber’s consideration. They argued that the case should have 
been brought under Article 6 and not Article 1 of the Protocol since the limitation 
period effectively denied a claimant a means of enforcing his or her rights at the end 
of the statutory period and that in any event the United Kingdom Government had not 
deprived the Pye of their land by appropriating it for their own use but that ‘the 
outcome of the proceedings was dictated by the applicant companies own inaction’ 
(para 43). In relation to Pye’s claim for compensation, therefore, they argued that this 
should be addressed under Article 6. Article 1 was not appropriate; why should the 
Government have to look after the applicant company when they have found 
themselves in this position through their own inaction? 
 
The United Kingdom Government also considered that the Chamber should, when 
considering the Government’s position, take into account that land was a limited 
resource and therefore the emphasis in relation to land should be that it be ‘used 
maintained and improved’ This implied that a finite time limit for recovery of land 
would encourage landowners to make use of their land. 
 
Whist Pye argued that the domestic law relating to adverse possession was out of line 
with other European states, the Government in response put forward to the Chamber 
that there was no European ‘norm’, that the limitation periods differed, that in some 
states good faith was irrelevant whist others took it into account together with a 
substantial number of other factors. 
 
In coming to its decision, the Grand Chamber considered the representations given by 
the parties as well as the earlier decisions in the domestic courts as well as the lower  
Chamber and, in its judgment, responded to each of the arguments put forward and 
separated out its response to deal with each of the issues. 
 
On the point of whether the matter should be dealt with under Article 1 of Protocol 1, 
the Grand Chamber concluded  that  Article 1 was applicable stating clearly that 
“there was nothing in principle to preclude the examination of a claim under Article 1 
of Protocol 1 where the complaint is directed against legislation concerning property 
rights”. Accordingly, the relevant legislation –the 1925 Law of Property Act and the 
1980 Limitation Act- was part of the general land law created by the United Kingdom 
Government that regulated the use of land ownership between individuals. 
 
 
 
After establishing the relevance of Article 1 of Protocol 1, the Grand Chamber then 
came to the conclusion that the relevant domestic legislation – in particular the 
Limitation Act 1980 - was effectively a means of regulating title rather than depriving 
a paper owner of title. The law , therefore, did not deprive a person of his possessions 
as defined under the first paragraph of Article 1 but the legislation was there as a 
means of ensuring that there was an ultimate control of the use of land. Indeed the 
Judges noted that the domestic courts in the earlier decisions had considered that the 
extinguishment of title at the end of an action of adverse possession was a “logical 
and pragmatic consequence.” Furthermore, Pye had never argued that the conclusions 
of the domestic courts on this point were unreasonable or unforeseeable in the light of 
the legislation. Indeed, both parties had used examples from other European States 
that had incorporated similar concepts of the limitation period in relation to adverse 
possession of land and in response the Grand Chamber agreed that the comparative 
material provided by both sides had shown that other European Union states had a 
similar mechanism of transferring titles using the mechanism of adverse possession   
(also without payment of compensation to the original owners). 
 
So, the Grand Chamber concluded that the case before them fell within the provisions 
of the second paragraph of Article 1 Protocol 1 namely:  
 
“The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties”  
 
Having  decided that the case , therefore, came within this second paragraph of Article 
1 it was then for the Grand Chamber to decide whether or not there existed a 
“reasonable relationship between the means employed and the aim sought to be 
realised”. In other words, was there a fair balance between this general interest in 
having a limitation period and the subsequent extinguishment of title and the interests 
of the original individual landowners themselves?   
 
 
In coming to its decision when weighing up the ‘fair balance’ argument the Grand 
Chamber noted that on more than one occasion very little action was required by Pye 
to stop time running (for example, by asking for rent, commencing an action for 
recovery) and, in addition, the relevant legislation had been in force many years prior 
to the extinguishment of title in this case.  (It should also be noted that during the 
relevant period the ownership of the property ‘technically’ changed  giving the 
opportunity of questions of any potential overriding interests to be raised, even when 
the parties involved may be associated  companies)  
 
The Grand Chamber decided that the ‘fair balance‘had not been upset. There was 
effectively no violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 in that the English law on adverse 
possession as a means of control on the use of land (acknowledging at the same time 
that land was a scarce resource) was proportionate. Pye had argued that the loss of the 
land was so great and the windfall to the Grahams so significant that in this case the 
balance had been upset. The Grand Chamber, nevertheless, took a clear objective 
stance (in comparison to some of the earlier decisions in the case, perhaps) by 
directing that if the limitation periods were to achieve their purpose they had to apply 
regardless of the size of the claim 
 
In response, therefore, to Pye’s claim for compensation, which was the fundamental 
aim of the case being brought to the European Courts, the Grand Chamber sided with 
the United Kingdom Government. It noted that ‘the requirement of compensation by a 
party who fails to observe the limitation period sits uneasily alongside the concept of 
limitation periods and thereby legal certainty’. To further emphasise the point the 
General Chamber referred to the Land Registration Act 2002 where no compensation 
is payable under these provisions by any person who becomes the registered owner at 
the end of the limitation period. 
 
 
 
 
Commentary 
 
 
The decision of the Grand Chamber is to be welcomed on a number of grounds.  The 
law of adverse possession in England is deeply rooted in some of the fundamental 
principles of land law.  The common law tradition in respect of ownership in land 
often turns more to the question of fact than right; in particular, the fact of sustained 
possession.28  One leading commentator writes, ‘the pre-eminent position accorded to 
de facto possession in English law ensures that there is no such thing as absolute title 
to land.  All title is ultimately relative: the title of the present possessor will 
customarily be upheld unless and until a better claim is advanced on behalf of 
somebody else.’29
 
  
 
As well as legal justifications for original acquisition through adverse possession of 
land, there are important social and economic justifications for the rules.  Certainty of 
title is one of the important social objectives behind rules of adverse possession.30
 
 If 
claims to land which have been based on long possession are nevertheless allowed to 
be defeated by others showing that they were owner some time in the past, it is 
inevitable that title to land becomes uncertain.  Such titles are not conducive to a 
liberal market engaged in exchange and bargain.  The basic premise must be that long 
unchallenged possession of land should not be disturbed. Of course some sort of 
wrongful possession of land should be disallowed, however, the Limitation Act 
operates in an arbitrary was in providing a cut off point when the true owner cannot 
challenge the title of another possessor of the land to which the original title 
pertained. The resulting uncertainty over title has impact not only on the person who 
has been in possession of land but, also third parties such as purchasers and 
mortgagees who may have interests in the land.  In other words, title in real property 
law must be seen as operating in a multitude of transaction concerning the same piece 
of land.  Uncertainty over title is undesirable because the effects are not only far 
reaching but they also affect more than one transaction.  It is only on reliance of title 
that some of these transactions are entered into; therefore subsequent uncertainty is a 
bad thing.  In this sense the law of adverse possession pursues a legitimate objective 
and is proportional to it. 
It is interesting to note that that the Grand Chamber in the course of its judgment 
appears to acknowledge that a domestic state should be given leeway in interpreting 
                                                          
28  This is not something which is new, it originates from the concept of seisin-possession.  This 
concept is at the roots of real property law and emphasizes that proprietary rights in land are based on 
physical possession rather than on abstract title.  The concept of seisin possession is examined in 
chapter 6.  For a more detailed account of the concept of seisin see, A.W.B. Simpson, An Introduction 
to the History of English Land Law (1961). 
29  K. Gray, Elements of Land Law, (1987), at p.64. 
30  See, M. Dockray, ‘Why Do We Need Adverse Possession’, [1985] Conveyancer 272. 
paragraph 2 of Article 1 and any consequential legislation. As specifically stated by 
the Grand Chamber in their judgment “states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation 
with regards both to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether 
the consequences of enforcement are justified for the purpose of achieving the object 
of the law in question.”   
 
The relevant provisions of the Land Registration Act 2002 relating to adverse 
possession were largely in response to government and judicial fears of the 
applicability of Article 1 on domestic decisions It would be interesting to speculate 
that, had the Grand Chamber issued this decision prior to the drafting of the Land 
Registration Act 2002, would its provisions have swung so much in favour of  
property owners “seeking protection from the Government against the consequences 
of their own inattention.”? 
 
 
 
 
